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GARCETTI V. CEBALLOS AND




In Garcetti v. Ceballos, the Supreme Court denied constitutional
protection to a deputy prosecutor named Richard Ceballos. In reaching
its decision, the Court pointed to the plethora of statutory protections
that were available to government whistleblowers. A closer examination
of these statutory alternatives reveals that they will not protect Ceballos.
This is the paradox of statutory protection in labor and employment
law-more sometimes is less for vulnerable workers.
This Article places the Garcetti case in the historical trajectory of
worker protection-from no protection to statutory protection. This
Article argues for a move toward constitutional and international
protection rather than statutory protection for several reasons. First, as
shown by the Garcetti case, courts can sometimes use the existence of
statutory protections as a reason to deny protection in a particular case.
Second, the statutory rights that have been provided in the past have
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failed to adequately protect whistleblowers, as shown by several recent
studies. Finally, legislation to protect government whistleblowers is
inherently limited by the fact that the very people creating the legislation
are likely to be the targets of the whistleblowing. Thus, there is a built-in
incentive to weaken statutory protection for whistleblowers.
After decisions like Garcetti, it may seem hard to argue for a
greater reliance on constitutional rights to protect whistleblowers. This
Article argues for constitutional rights because of the importance they
hold in our legal system, and because whistleblowing is the kind of core
political speech that the First Amendment is supposed to protect. Thus,
this Article applies progressive constitutionalist ideas to both Garcetti
and the protection of whistleblowers generally, as a way to break down
the distinctions between employees that the Court's decision creates.
In this Article, I argue, for several reasons, that even in the face
of a decision like Garcetti courts should not be dismissed as a strategy
for protecting whistleblowers. First, the Garcetti decision can be limited
to its unique facts through further litigation. Second, I argue for judicial
protection of whistleblowers because there is nothing in the Constitution
that suggests whistleblowers should not be covered. Finally, while
whistleblowing is still protected for most employees, it is important to
maintain constitutional protection for public employees because of the
important political values that government whistleblowing embodies.
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court decision in Garcetti v.
CeballosI is a blow to the constitutional rights of public employee• 2
whistleblowers. The after-effects of Garcetti have already been felt in
1. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
2. See Cynthia Estlund, Harmonizing Work and Citizenship: A Due Process
Solution to a First Amendment Problem, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 115, 116-117 (2007)
(discussing the significance of the Garcetti decision); Bruce A. Green, Prosecutors'
Professional Independence: Reflections on Garcetti v. Ceballos, CRIM. JUST.,
Summer 2007, at 4, 6; Paul M. Secunda, Whither the Pickering Rights of Federal
Employees? (Marquette Law School Legal Studies Paper No. 08-10]), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=1010243. But see Elizabeth Dale, Employee Speech and
Management Rights: A Counterintuitive Reading of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 29
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 175, 175 (2008) (arguing that Garcetti actually benefits
2008]
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the lower courts and may continue to be felt for years to come.3 The
Court narrowed the scope of the First Amendment protections that public
employees had enjoyed for decades.4 After Garcetti, if a public
employee speaks about possible wrongdoing at work, the employee will
not be constitutionally protected for "speech made pursuant to the
employee's official duties."5
public employee speech rights); Lawrence Rosenthal, The Emerging First
Amendment Law of Managerial Prerogative (Chapman Univ. Sch. of Law, Paper
No. 08-07, 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1087693 (refuting the claim
that Garcetti affected rights of whistleblowers by stating that the case did not
concern whistleblowers at all).
3. Indeed, the effects have already begun. See Campbell v. Galloway, 483
F.3d 258, 266-72 (4th Cir. 2007); Spiegla v. Hull, 481 F.3d 961, 967 (7th Cir. 2007);
Haynes v. City of Circeville, 474 F.3d 357, 362-65 (6th Cir. 2007); Andrew v. Clark,
472 F. Supp. 2d 659, 661-63 (D. Md. 2007); Franklin v. Clark, 454 F. Supp.2d 356,
359-61 (D. Md. 2006) (mem.); DePrado v. City of Miami, 446 F. Supp. 2d 1344,
1345-47 (S.D. Fla. 2006), affd per curiam, 264 F. App'x 769 (2008); Brewster v.
City of Poughkeepsie, 434 F. Supp. 2d 155, 156-57 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). But see,
Williams v. Riley, 275 F. App'x 385, 388-90 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (finding
against dismissal of jailers' First Amendment claims because of uncertainty as to
whether reporting misconduct was their official duty under Garcetti); Morales v.
Jones, 494 F. 3d 590, 598 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding deposition testimony protected
under Garcetti); Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 492 F. 3d 1192,
1203-05 (10th Cir. 2007) (finding elements of teachers' speech protectable under
Garcetti because not part of their official duties); Lindsey v. City of Orrick, 491 F.3d
892, 897-98 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding public works director's speech regarding
violation of sunshine law protectable as citizen speech); Walters v. County of
Maricopa, No. CV 04-1920-PHX-NVW, 2006 WL 2456173, at *14 (D. Ariz. Aug.
22, 2006) (finding police sergeant's whistleblowing protected under framework of
Garcetti because not a duty of employment).
4. See, e.g., Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 383-84 (1987) (public
employer recognized as a government entity operating under the constraints of the
First Amendment); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983) (employee must
show that he or she is speaking out on a matter of public concern); Pickering v. Bd.
of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (employee must show his or her First
Amendment interests as a citizen outweigh the government interest in running an
efficient government service for the public); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (employee must prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that engaging in the protected speech was a substantial or motivating
factor for the adverse employment action the employee suffered).
5. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 413 (holding that plaintiffs expressions were made in
connection with official responsibilities and thus were not protected by the First
Amendment).
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One response to the decision has been to argue for greater
6statutory protections for public employees. In fact, amendments to the
Whistleblower Protection Act
7 are currently pending in Congress.
8
These amendments aim to ameliorate the effects of Garcetti as they
relate to federal employees. 9 While there does not seem to be a parallel
movement in the states to fortify whistleblower protections, most states
have statutes that aim to protect government employees who report
wrongdoing.' 0 Public employee unions and whistleblower groups have
also been active in advancing the cause of whistleblowers.11
Despite the good intentions of these statutory efforts, they are
unlikely to fully protect public employee whistleblowers. In this Article,
I argue that statutory protection for whistleblowers can be ineffective and
sometimes counterproductive for public employees in several ways.
First, statutes are prone to leave gaps in protection, and workers may fall
through the cracks. Second, as shown by Garcetti, courts may use the
existence of statutory protection to deny constitutional protection to
vulnerable workers. Finally, taking constitutional protection away from
public employees takes away their rights as citizens, ironically, just as
their political power and ability is ascendant. The Court's decision takes
rights outside the realm of fundamental constitutional rights and makes
them subject to the political process.
This Article uses the Garcetti case to express skepticism about
statutory efforts to protect whistleblowers-the paradox of statutory
protection, or the idea that more statutory protection is not necessarily
better for employees. In Garcetti, the Supreme Court has justified the
6. Yolanda Woodlee, Former D.C. Workers Say Law Doesn't Prevent
Retaliation: Employees Say They Were Fired After Filing Complaints, Despite
Whistle-blower Act, WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 2008, at B01 (discussing the stories of
several employees fired for status as whistleblowers).
7. 5 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006).
8. Stephen Barr, Pressing for Stronger Protections for Whistleblowers, WASH.
POST, June 6, 2008, at D03 (discussing efforts by organizations to push legislation
through Congress).
9. H.R. 985, 1 1 0 th Cong. § 2 (2007).
10. See C. FRED ALFORD, WHISTLEBLOWERS: BROKEN LIVES AND
ORGANIZATIONAL POWER (2001).
11. See, e.g., Colorado Silences Health Care Workers Who See Errors, UNA
ACTION, Summer 2006, http://www.afscme.org/publications/10965.cfm.
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denial of legal protection by referring to federal and state statutory
protections that already exist for whistleblowers. "The dictates of sound
judgment," Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court majority, "are reinforced
by the powerful network of legislative enactments-such as
whistleblower statutes and labor codes-available to those who seek to
expose wrongdoing."'
2
In dissent, Justice Souter correctly pointed out that the Court
majority's advice to "rest easy" because of the availability of statutory
protection for workers like Ceballos "fails on its own terms."' 3 After
explaining why the various whistleblower statutes would not protect
Ceballos, Justice Souter explained:
My point is not to disparage particular statutes or speak
here to the merits of interpretations by other federal
courts, but merely to show the current understanding of
statutory protection: individuals doing the same sorts of
governmental jobs and saying the same sorts of things
addressed to civic concerns will get different protection
depending on the local, state or federal jurisdictions that
happened to employ them.14
Justice Souter's dissenting opinion also correctly pointed out that
many of the statutes that the Court majority cited are not alternatives for
whistleblowers like Ceballos.'
5
The point of this Article is to question whether whistleblower
statutes can adequately protect public sector employees. This Article
begins in Part II by placing Garcetti in the context of public employee
rights. In Part III, I describe the paradox of statutory protection, alluding
to examples in the labor and employment area in which the proliferation
of protective legislation has failed to adequately protect workers. Part IV
applies this paradox to the Garcetti case, by showing how few statutory
alternatives Richard Ceballos, the plaintiff deputy district attorney, had
besides the constitutional claim that he asserted in the case. While
12. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) (2006)).
13. Id. at 439 (Souter, J., dissenting).
14. Id. at 441 (Souter, J., dissenting).
15. Id. at 439-41 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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statutory protections are useful tools for worker advocates, I argue that
legislation should not be the main focus of litigation or lobbying efforts.
Part V argues that advocates on behalf of public employee
whistleblowers should consider arguing for rights that transcend the
blowing winds of political change, and instead continue to press the
fundamental and even international aspects of worker rights. Further, in
Part VI I explain why international and constitutional rights are more
universal and make public employees less likely to be subject to the
interest group politics that befall statutory change. In this way, public
employees can reclaim their rights as citizens, which should not be
lightly waived simply by taking public employment. In the end, I argue
for rights that transcend the domestic legislative sphere.
II. THE CONTEXT OF THE GARCETTI CASE
AND PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RIGHTS
As Professor Joseph Slater writes in his seminal work on public
workers: "[u]ntil the late 1960s, judges repeatedly rejected claims that
constitutional rights to association, speech, due process, or equal
protection trumped bans on labor affiliation in public employment." 16
Indeed, it was not until Wisconsin passed the first public sector labor
laws in 1959 and 1962 that any state protected the right to organize by
statute. 17  The precursors to these statutory protections for public
employees were important Supreme Court decisions that recognized the
constitutional rights to reject loyalty oaths 18 and mandatory disclosures
of organizational affiliations. 9 These decisions laid the groundwork for
the Supreme Court's decision in Pickering v. Board of Education20 in
1968. In Pickering, the Court affirmed the rights of public employees to
speak on matters of public concern under the First Amendment. The
Pickering test became the standard for protecting public workers, so long
16. JOSEPH E. SLATER, PUBLIC WORKERS 80 (2004).
17. Id. at 158-59.
18. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485-90 (1960).
19. See Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 184-91 (1952).
20. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
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as the speech did not impair the efficiency of the government
21
organization.
Subsequent cases institutionalized the Pickering two-step test.
First, determine whether or not the public employee's speech concerns a
matter of public concern. Second, balance the speech against the impact
it has on the effectiveness of the government agency.2 In some cases,
the employee did not make it past the "public concern" prong. In
Connick v. Myers,23 for example, the speech of a deputy district attorney
about complaints in the office did not, for the most part, warrant the
24
public's concern in the Court's view. In Rankin v. McPherson, the
attempted assassination of President Ronald Reagan and his policies on
welfare and the urban poor were matters of public concern, which caused
plaintiff McPherson, a deputy constable, to say to a coworker: "[s]hoot,
if they go for him [Reagan] again, I hope they get him." Upon
application of the Pickering test, the Court deemed the speech to be
protected by the First Amendment, since it did not interfere with the
25functioning of her office.
These cases show that the Pickering test, while subject to some
judicial discretion, still recognized the basic idea that public employees
do not shed all of their constitutional rights at the workplace door. Thus,
when the court agreed to hear the Ninth Circuit's decision in Ceballos v.
Garcetti,26 advocates argued that the application of the Pickering test
27
would make Ceballos' speech protected. In order to evaluate that
claim, let us turn to the facts of Garcetti.
21. Id. at 568.
22. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384-88 (1987) (holding that
speech made in the course of conversation about the President's policies was a
public concern); see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149-50 (1983) (holding
that a segment of a questionnaire inquiring about whether district attorneys were
pressured to work in political campaigns was a matter of public interest).
23. 461 U.S. at 148.
24. 483 U.S. at 381.
25. Id. at 388-89. But see City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 84 (2004)
(holding a police officer's pornographic video is not a matter of public concern).
26. 361 F.3d 1168, 1180 (9th Cir. 2004), rev'd, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (holding
that Ceballos' speech was protected by the First Amendment).
27. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent at 17-18, Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410
(2006) (No. 04-473), 2005 WL 1801035 ("Since this Court's decisions in Pickering
and Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), expression by a public employee that
[Vol. 7
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In February 2000, Richard Ceballos was a supervising calendar
deputy in the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office, then
headed by Gil Garcetti. Ceballos' immediate supervisors were Carol
Najera and Frank Sunstedt. Ceballos had concerns about a search
warrant in a prosecution for an auto parts theft. The defense attorney
told Ceballos that the search warrant that was used to procure evidence
of the defendant's guilt had fatal flaws in it. After confronting the
sheriff's deputy who gave the affidavit and examining the subject
property himself, Ceballos decided that the affidavit was faulty and
notified the defense. After the judge hearing the matter denied the
defense motion to dismiss the case based on the faulty search warrant,
28the defendant was convicted on all counts.
After the disagreement that Ceballos had with his superiors over
the search warrant affidavit, he was transferred to a far-flung post in
Pomona, which he deemed a demotion. In response, Ceballos filed a
First Amendment lawsuit against the district attorney and his superiors,
alleging that they had retaliated against him for his speech on a matter of
public concern. The district court dismissed the case based on the fact
that Ceballos was not speaking as a citizen, but instead pursuant to his
"employment duties. '29 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals challenged
relates 'to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community' is
presumptively protected under the First Amendment. Of particular relevance here,
the Court has acknowledged that speech 'seek[ing] to bring to light actual or
potential wrongdoing or breach of public trust' or other fundamental governmental
misdeeds is especially deserving of constitutional protection."); Brief for the Nat'l
Treasury Employees Union as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 17-18,
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (No. 04-473), 2005 WL 1749167
("Moreover, because Pickering's balancing test provides ample protection to
legitimate government interests, petitioners err in claiming that a limit on the scope
of constitutionally protected speech is necessary to avoid disruption of government
operations. There is, in short, no reason to disturb the long-standing framework
under which both work-related speech and work-required speech on matters of
public concern are weighed under the Pickering balance, in order to protect the
interests of all: the public, the employee, and the government employer.").
28. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 415. See also Terry Smith, Speaking Against Norms:
Public Discourse and the Economy of Racialization in the Workplace, 57 AM. U. L.
REv. 523, 537-38 (2008) (discussing the fact-pattern in Garcetti).
29. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 415.
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this dichotomy, reversing the district court's decision and holding that
Ceballos' lawsuit was not precluded by his official duties.3°
The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that Ceballos' official
duties meant that his speech about the search warrant affidavit had no
First Amendment protection. He was a supervising calendar deputy, who
apparently had responsibility to press the office's case regardless of
retaliation that he might have suffered for raising problems with the
prosecution. In the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy favored the
official duties exception because of the need for employee speech to be
accurate, "demonstrate sound judgment, and promote the employer's
mission."3 ' A contrary rule, according to the Court, would "commit state
and federal courts to a new, permanent, and intrusive role, mandating
judicial oversight."
32
Various questions remain about the scope of the official duties
exception that will vitiate protection for whistleblowers. But the effects
of Garcetti have already been felt. At least one circuit court decision has
denied First Amendment protection to public employees as a result.' 33
The full impact of the Garcetti decision remains to be seen, but it would
be hard to argue that removing an entire category of workers from the
protection of the First Amendment is an improvement on the protection
available to whistleblowers.
III. MARGINAL PROTECTIONS FOR WORKERS:
MORE Is NOT ALWAYS BETTER
American society saw a dramatic increase in the statutory
protections afforded to workers throughout the twentieth century.34 In
the early 1900s, employers still had free reign to run the workplace, with
common law employment at will essentially unmodified by any statutory
30. Id. at 415-16.
31. Id. at 423.
32. Id.
33. See Davis v. McKinney, 518 F.3d 304 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that a
public employee of the University of Texas system was not afforded protection).
34. See generally National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-69
(2000); Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2000); Civil Rights
Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000); Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (2000).
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protections for workers.35 Minimum wage and overtime protections did
not exist at the federal level, and workers could be fired for retaliatory
36and discriminatory reasons. The New Deal brought a host of protective
labor statutes, such as the National Labor Relations Act of 1935
(NLRA)37 and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.
31
The labor movement established a foothold in the private sector
workplace with the help of the NLRA, but the efficacy of the law and
whether the law actually "deradicalized" the labor movement have long
been debated.39 Regardless of the merits of these respective arguments,
it is clear that the fortunes of the labor movement have waned from the
high water mark for unionization in the 1950s, at approximately thirty-
five percent of the work force.4 ° There may be several causes for the
decline of the labor movement, such as globalization and increased• .• 41
illegal employer resistance to unionization. While there have long been
hopes, and efforts, to improve the NLRA, few in the labor movement
believe that changes in the law alone will result in an increase in labor's
impact on the American workplace.42
Similarly, minimum wage and overtime statutes, while important
for establishing a floor under which no worker can fall, failed to establish
35. Scott A. Moss, Where There's At-Will, There are Many Ways: Redressing
the Increasing Incoherence of Employment at Will, 67 U. PITr. L. REV. 295, 362
(2005-2006).
36. For a discussion of the American development of an employment at will
rule, see Jay M. Feinman, The Development Of The Employment at Will Rule, 20
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 122-29 (1976).
37. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-69 (2000); see also PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE
WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW (1990).
38. 29 U.S.C. § 201-19 (2000).
39. For one view on NLRA deradicalization, see Karl Klare, Judicial
Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal
Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1977-1978).
40. KIM MOODY, U.S. LABOR IN TROUBLE AND TRANSITION: THE FAILURE OF
REFORM FROM ABOVE, THE PROMISE OF REVIVAL BELOW 100 (2007).
41. Lori A. Nessel, Undocumented Immigrants in the Workplace. The Fallacy
of Labor Protection and the Need for Reform, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 345
(2001).
42. See Clyde W. Summers, Employment at Will in the United States: The
Divine Right of Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 79-81 (2000-2001).
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a "living wage. 43 Numerous exemptions apply to take large portions of
the workforce completely out of the coverage of either minimum wage or
overtime law.44 Complicated categories exempt professionals and otherS 45
employees from overtime regulations. Workers who have been cheated
out of pay have flocked to large class actions, resulting in costly
46settlements. At the same time, the buying power of American workers
is not keeping pace with the high costs of modem society.47
Finally, public employees have also seen an evolution in their
protections at work against employer retaliation and collective
bargaining. The first part of the twentieth century was marked by Justice
Holmes' aphorism that a policeman "may have a constitutional right to• ,,48
talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman. The
right to unionize was first won for public employees in Wisconsin in the
1950s with the passage of the first collective bargaining statute.49 Since
then, public employees have won a number of protections at work, under
state and federal statutes and the U.S. Constitution.50  Nevertheless,
43. STEPHANIE LUCE & ROBERT POLLIN, THE LIVING WAGE: BUILDING A FAIR
ECONOMY (2d ed. 2000).
44. Independent contractors, for example, are not considered "employees"
under the Fair Labor Standards Act. See, e.g., Reich v. Circle C. Investments, Inc.,
998 F.2d 324, 327 (1993) (listing factors that determine whether a worker is an
employee or contractor).
45. Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, for example, an employee's salary
and duties can exempt the worker from both minimum wage and overtime pay. 29
U.S.C. § 213(a) (2000).
46. See Claude Walbert, Boston Market Settles Class Cases with 7,000
Employees, L.A. DAILY JOURNAL, Nov. 17, 2006; Claude Walbert, Workers Sue
Restaurant Owner Over Breaks for Rest and Meals, L.A. DAILY JOURNAL, July 7,
2006 at 1, 9.
47. Michael M. Grynbaum, Living Costs Rising Fast, and Wages Trailing,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2008, at Cl.; Jared Bernstein & Isaac Shapiro, Buying Power
of Minimum Wage at 51 Year Low: Congress Could Break Record For Longest
Period Without an Increase, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, June 20,
2006, http://www.cbpp.org/6-20-06mw.htm (finding that value of minimum wage
has fallen behind wages of other workers).
48. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892).
49. JOSEPH E. SLATER, PUBLIC WORKERS: GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE UNIONS,
THE LAW, AND THE STATE, 1900-1962, 159-92 (2004).
50. See, e.g., Le Pore v. Nat'l Tool & Mfg. Co., 115 N.J. 226 (N.J. 1989)
(affirming the judgment in favor of respondent employee in his action against
[Vol. 7
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public employees remain subject to a number of statutory restrictions to
their freedom of association, right to strike, and right to earn overtime. 51
In addition, federal pension protection does not apply to public
employees.52 All the while, public employees are vilified in the popular
press as being overpaid and underworked.53
The foregoing examples provide an overview of the marginal
protections that exist for many workers. There are many other examples
to support that point. A more insidious form of marginalization occurs
when workers are actually between the borders of different bodies of
legal protection. This occurred with black workers who sought the
protection of the NLRA but were informed that they should have made a
claim under antidiscrimination law,54 and where workers who claimed
that "citizens-only" hiring policies discriminated against them based on
appellant employer because an employee covered by a collective-bargaining
agreement could maintain an action for wrongful discharge for reporting workplace
safety violations); Teamsters Nat'l Auto. Transporters Indus. Negotiating Comm. v.
Troha, 328 F.3d 325 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that federal common law created a
cause of action by which a party to a collective-bargaining agreement that was
otherwise covered by § 301 could enforce an arbitration subpoena against a non-
signatory of the agreement as such suits were necessary to the purpose of enforcing
the agreement to arbitrate); Paul M. Secunda, Reflections on the Technicolor Right to
Association in American Labor and Employment Law, 96 KY. L.J. 343, 347-64
(2007-2008) (discussing constitutional right to associate for public employees); S.
Barry Paisner & Michelle R. Haubert-Barela, Correcting the Imbalance: The New
Mexico Public Employee Bargaining Act and the Statutory Rights Provided To
Public Employees, 37 N.M. L. REv. 357, 360-69 (2007) (discussing federal and state
statutory protection for public employees).
51. See Clyde W. Summers, Public Sector Bargaining: A Different Kind of
Animal, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 441 (2003).
52. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1) (2000).
53. The City of San Diego, for example, has undergone a financial crisis, in
which most of the blame has fallen on city employees and their pensions. See, e.g.,
Steve Schmidt & Danielle Cervantes, City Caught in Payroll Vise, S.D. UNION
TRIBUNE, Dec. 11, 2005, at A1; see also Ed Mendel, Vallejo Blames Bankruptcy on
Contracts with Unions, S.D. UNION TRIBUNE, June 9, 2008, at Al, A8. Secunda,
supra note 50, at 347-64; S. Barry Paisner & Michelle R. Haubert-Barela,
Correcting the Imbalance: The New Mexico Public Employee Bargaining Act and
the Statutory Rights Provided To Public Employees, 37 N.M. L. REv. 357, 360-69
(2007) (discussing federal and state statutory protection for public employees).
54. Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50, 69-73
(1975).
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their race and national origin were told they should have claimed that the
employer's policy had a disparate impact on them, even though such a
claim would not likely be more successful than their claim of disparate
treatment.55
In order to deal with the problems of the NLRA, labor has
become interested in amending the law through the Employee Free
56Choice Act. This bill, which passed the House in 2007, has stalled in
the Senate. The bill aims to make it easier for workers to form unions
through card check recognition, but it is unlikely to completely change
the environment for union organizing. 5'
As discussed above, Richard Ceballos, the plaintiff in Garcetti,
also faced the statutory double bind-the plethora of statutory
protections made it easier for the Court to deny him protection under the
Constitution, in part because of the fear of "constitutionalizing" every
dispute had by a public employee. As I argue below, many of these
statutory avenues are dead ends for Ceballos and employees like him.
IV. BLIND ALLEYS: THE LACK OF PROMISE
IN MANY WHISTLEBLOWER STATUTES
A. Why Richard Ceballos May Have Chosen the Constitutional Option
There are several statutes that Ceballos could have used as a basis
for recovery, but each presents significant obstacles. These legislative
protections do not provide adequate safeguards for those seeking to
expose wrongdoing without risking employer retaliation. These statutory
flaws probably made the First Amendment claim, rather than a
whistleblower retaliation claim, more attractive for Ceballos.
55. Espinoza v. Farah, 414 U.S. 86, 92-93, 95 (1973).
56. H.R. 800, 100th Cong. (as passed by House, March 1, 2007); S. 1041,
100th Cong. (2007).
57. Liegia S. DiFazio, Checks and Ballots: Union Recognition in the United
States, Canada and the United Kingdom in Light of the Employee Free Choice Act,
34 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 689, 690-691 (2006).
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1. Civil Service Reform Act
The Court in Garcetti cited the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA)
18as an available option for Ceballos . The CSRA prohibits personnel
actions based on an employee's disclosure of "a violation of any law,
rule, or regulation., 59 A "personnel action" includes promotions,
transfers, and reassignments, such as the one that Ceballos alleged that
he suffered. 60 First, it is debatable whether anyone involved in the
prosecution Ceballos oversaw violated a law or regulation, as well as to
whom Ceballos was required to disclose the violation. Moreover, and
more importantly, Ceballos, as a supervising deputy district attorney, is
not an employee of the federal government. Therefore, the CSRA is
unavailable for his protection.
Even employees who are covered by the statute might find the
CSRA to be an inadequate remedy, because the statute contains no
private right of action. 61 The statute requires that the plaintiff exhaust all
62administrative remedies before seeking judicial review. Furthermore,
plaintiffs who file under the CSRA give up the right to file claims for
wrongful termination, emotional distress, and breach of the covenant of
63good faith and fair dealing, because the CSRA preempts these claims.
2. California Whistleblower Protection Act
The second whistleblower protection relied upon by the Court
was the California Whistleblower Protection Act (CWPA).6' The CWPA
was enacted to encourage the disclosure of "improper governmental
58. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425. See also 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) (2006).
59. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A)(i) (2006).
60. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2) (2006).
61. See, e.g., Braun v. U.S., 707 F.2d 922 (6th Cir. 1983); Broadway v. Block,
694 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1982); Borrell v. U.S. Int'l Commc'n Agency, 682 F.2d 981
(D.C. Cir. 1982).
62. Ferry v. Hayden, 954 F.2d 658, 660-61 (1 1th Cir. 1992).
63. Mahtesian v. Lee, 406 F.3d 1131, 1134 (9th Cir. 2005) (tort claims are
barred by the CSRA).
64. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 8547 (2005).
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activity. ' '65 The Act provides a state administrative process to protect
66
individuals reporting governmental misconduct. Employers who
retaliate against whistleblowers face a potential ten thousand dollar fine
and possible jail time limited to one year, in addition to any applicable
67
discipline for improper governmental activities. Additionally, the
statute authorizes civil damages, punitive damages, and reasonable
attorney's fees to a successful CWPA claimant.
68
In Garcetti, the Ninth Circuit determined that giving
69
constitutional protection to Ceballos would render the CWPA obsolete.
The CSRA provides the most applicable and adequate protection for
Ceballos, but it is not a flawless remedy. Like the CSRA, the CWPA has
70
a mandatory, complex, and multi-tiered administrative procedure.
First, the applicant must file the complaint with the State Personnel
Board (the Board).7' Following an investigation, the Board will issue
72
findings as to the retaliation. The respondent then has an opportunity to
call for a hearing before the Board to address the allegations.73 Under
the statute, there is no opportunity for a plaintiff who alleges a CWPA
retaliation claim to have the claim heard in court.74
Another obstacle to the remedies available under CWPA is that
the plaintiff must have filed a written complaint with the employer
before instituting proceedings. Here, Ceballos would not be penalized
because he filed an internal grievance before suing. However, the
written complaint requirement may preclude other plaintiffs from
utilizing CWPA. 75 Furthermore, plaintiffs wishing to utilize CWPA have
65. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 8547.2 (2005); see also Braun v. Bureau of State
Audits, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 791, 793 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
66. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8547.8 (2005).
67. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 8547.8(b) (2005).
68. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 8547.8(c) (2005).
69. Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1192 (9th Cir. 2004) (O'Scannlain, J.,
specially concurring).
70. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 19683 (1995).
71. CAL. GOv'T CODE § 19683(a) (1995).
72. Id.
73. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 19683(b) (1995).
74. Id.
75. See Cornejo v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., No. C045753, 2005 WL 2189461
(Cal. App. 3 Dist. Sept. 12, 2005) (finding plaintiff was precluded from recovery
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only one year from the time of the retaliation to file a claim with the
Board. 76 This was not a problem for Ceballos, but might be for other
plaintiffs in his position.
The exclusive administrative processes of CWPA might have
made a CWPA claim unattractive to Ceballos. This would leave out
many of the remedies that are most valuable to whistleblowers, such as
attorneys' fees and injunctions under civil rights statutes.77 Yet, next to
his constitutional claim, the CWPA gives Ceballos the most adequate
remedy of the three statutes in this Article.
3. Whistleblower Protection Statute
The final statute relied on by Justice Kennedy in Garcetti is the
Whistleblower Protection Statute (WPS) in the California Labor Code.78
Under the WPS, employees may not be prevented from or retaliated
against for reporting state or federal violations of laws when they
79disclose the information to a government or law enforcement agency.
In a prima facie case under WPS, the plaintiff must prove (1) he engaged
in a protected activity, (2) he suffered an adverse employment action,
and (3) there is a causal link between the protected activity and the
adverse employment action.
80
when she failed to file a written complaint with her employer before filing suit for
claims of whistleblower retaliation).
76. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8547.8(a) (2005).
77. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988. Section 1983 authorizes courts to use legal and
equitable remedies when civil rights are violated. Section 1988 provides for an
award of reasonable attorneys fees to the prevailing party in Section 1983 litigation.
See also OWEN Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978).
78. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.5 (2003); see also Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425.
79. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.5 (2003).
80. See, e.g., Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif, 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d 638,
659 (Cal. 2006) (citing Morgan v. Regents Univ. of Cal., 88 Cal. App. 4th 52, 69
(Cal. App. 1 Dist. 2001)) ("To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff
must show that she engaged in protected activity, that she was thereafter subjected to
adverse employment action by her employer, and there was a causal link between the
two."); See also Patten v. Grant Joint Union High Sch. Dist., 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 113,
117 (Cal. App. 3 Dist. 2005) (to establish a prima facie case of retaliation "a plaintiff
must show (1) she engaged in a protected activity; (2) her employer subjected her to
an adverse employment action; and (3) there is a causal link between the two.").
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The CWPA also leaves unresolved whether an employee of a
government or law enforcement agency may simply report the violation
to his superiors. In Gardenshire v. Housing Authority,8 1 the California
Court of Appeal found that a high-ranking employee of the Los Angeles
City Housing Authority could receive whistleblower protection under
WPS when she reported an enforcement violation directly to her
superior.82 The distinction made in Gardenshire was that the plaintiff
would have no reason to expect that reporting to a higher authority was
83
necessary.
On the other hand, in an unpublished California Court of Appeal
opinion, Penaflor v. City of San Diego,84 a low-level parking
enforcement employee was not entitled to whistleblower protection when
she reported widespread double billing to her supervisor, a co-worker,
and an internal accounting official because these individuals were not the
proper "government or law enforcement [authority].'85
The facts in Garcetti indicate Ceballos disclosed the information
to the court (testifying as a witness), his superiors and employees from
the sheriffs office (reporting in a special meeting), and to the defense
counsel (writing in a memo). These disclosures fall short of those in
Gardenshire. In Gardenshire, the employee-plaintiff was head of a
department within the Housing Authority. 86 Ceballos, as a calendaring
deputy district attorney, was higher up than the low-level employee in
Penaflor, but not nearly a department head like Gardenshire. In
Gardenshire, the plaintiff informed the Housing Authority's
commissioners, who are the highest echelons of the government body.
8 7
Among the people Ceballos informed were his immediate supervisor and
the Head Deputy District Attorney. 88 The Head Deputy District Attorney
supervised Ceballos' immediate supervisor. However, Ceballos could
have informed the District Attorney. Yet, he did more than the plaintiff
81. 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
82. Id. at 897-98.
83. Id. at 897.
84. No. D038726, 2003 WL 1020382, at *1 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. Mar. 11, 2003).
85. Id. at *9.
86. Gardenshire, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 894.
87. Id. at 895.
88. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 414 (2006).
[Vol. 7
in Penaflor, where the highest level reporting was only to the plaintiffs
immediate supervisor.
8 9
It comes down to a question of whether Ceballos would have
reasonably expected that he needed to inform someone else. Ceballos
could have reasonably been expected to inform the District Attorney,
who was the highest supervisory authority in the relevant governmental
organization. Ceballos probably did not inform a governmental or law
enforcement agency under WPS when he informed two supervisory
levels above his own position. Therefore, his whistleblowing is probably
not protected activity under WPS.
Additionally, the inaccuracies in the warrant may not have been a
violation of a governmental regulation or law under the statue. When
warrants are issued under false circumstances, there are constitutional
issues; however, there may not have been a governmental regulation or
statute that might have been violated.
90
For example, the court suggested in Penaflor that an inaccuracy
within the city's accounting that resulted in individuals paying their
traffic citations twice was not a "violation of ... federal statute or...
regulation."9' Therefore, when she disclosed the billing mistake Penaflor
was not making a protected disclosure. Inaccuracies are not within the
scope of WPS protected disclosures.
Similarly, in Garcetti, there were "inaccuracies in an affidavit"
92used to obtain a search warrant. Ceballos believed that the sheriffs
deputy made misrepresentations about tire tracks and a roadwayS93
designation. Under WPS, Ceballos would have a difficult time proving
that his reporting an inaccuracy in an affidavit to two supervisors, but not
the District Attorney, is a protected disclosure. He would therefore not
likely choose to pursue a claim under that cause of action.
None of these three statutory whistleblower protections provide
the "powerful network of legislative enactments" to adequately protect
89. Penaflor, 2003 WL 1020382, at *2.
90. The sheriff deputy's affidavit may have been perjurious, but that would
require a further inquiry into whether or not the officer knowingly testified falsely or
simply made an error in judgment.
91. Penaflor, 2003 WL 1020382, at *9.
92. 547 U.S. at 413.
93. Id. at 414.
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Ceballos or other whistleblowers. 94 Rather, as Justice Souter suggests in
his dissenting opinion, whistleblower statutes should not be relied upon
to preclude constitutional claims.95 Only the CWPA would apply to
Ceballos' specific facts. Even then, his claim would be subject to a
cumbersome administrative process that would provide only a limited
remedy. These examples show the limits of statutory protections.
4. Professional Norms
While not technically a statutory protection, the Court also
referred to the "rules of conduct and constitutional obligations apart from
the First Amendment" upon which Ceballos might rely.96  Although
many lawyers would be guided by the principles of the American Bar
Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct (ABA Model Rules),
because Ceballos was a California lawyer, the California Rules of
Professional Conduct apply.
The California Rules do not have whistleblower protection.
Unlike some states, California has provided whistleblower protection to
in-house attorneys who report wrongdoing by their employer.97 In
General Dynamics v. Superior Court,98 the California Supreme Court
held that an employee attorney of a corporation could bring an action to
redress the retaliation he suffered when complaining to superiors about
illegal activities at General Dynamics.99 His lawsuit against his former
employer was dismissed at the trial level because of the traditional
94. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425.
95. Id. at 428 (Souter, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 412, 425.
97. The Illinois courts, for example, have rejected a cause of action for in-
house lawyers who are whistleblowers. See Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 145 1ll.2d 492,
584 N.E2d 104 (1991); Hoffman v. Baltimore Police Dept., 379 F. Supp. 2d 778,
784 (D. Md. 2005); Wise v. Consul Edison Co. of N.Y., 723 N.Y.S. 2d 462 (N.Y.
2001); Weider v. Skala, 609 N.E.2d 105 (N.Y. 1992).
98. 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1 (Cal. 1994).
99. ABA Model Rule of Professional Responsibility 8.3(a) requires lawyers to
report ethical violations. MODEL R. PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (2008). In
California, the lawyer's only duty is not to "knowingly assist in, solicit, or induce
any violation of [the rules]." CAL. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 1-120 (2008).
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loyalty that exists between lawyer and client, even when the lawyer is
also the client's employee. 1°
The California Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of the claim,
affirming the fact that lawyers have the right, as do other employees, to
be free from retaliation. Because of the place of trust they hold,
however, the employment rights of lawyers can be limited. If the
attorney's lawsuit requires the disclosure of confidential information, the
suit must be dismissed. The court recognized that there may be other
ways to allow litigation by lawyers through in camera review or
protective orders. In prior cases, the court held that the tort of wrongful
discharge in California, as in most states, must be based on the
employer's retaliation against the employee's upholding a public policy
based on a statute or constitutional provision. For lawyers, however, the
General Dynamics court stated that the lawyer must base their retaliation
case on a mandatory duty of professional conduct.
The problem for a California lawyer like Ceballos is that
whistleblowing is not a mandatory duty. Unlike the ABA Model Rules,
a California lawyer is not required to report wrongdoing by another
lawyer. 0 I Under both sets of rules, a public prosecutor has the duty to
make sure that all prosecutions are brought with probable cause, which
may have not been met in the prosecution that Ceballos questioned
because of the faulty search warrant. Further, the problem with the
search warrant in the prosecution may not have been enough at the
beginning of the prosecution to vitiate probable cause.
It should be noted here that no provision of the law governing
lawyers specifically prohibits retaliation against a subordinate for
reporting misconduct to state bar authorities. In California, for example,
the most analogous Rule of Professional Conduct is the one prohibiting
bias and retaliation on the basis of race, gender, and other categories. 1
2
This provision would clearly not apply in Ceballos' case, so his superiors
would be unlikely to face any bar discipline even if they were found by a
tribunal to have retaliated against him for his complaints.
100. Id. (holding that a retaliatory discharge claim will not proceed in
circumstances where resolution cannot be met without breaching the attorney-client
privilege).
101. See CAL. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 1-120 (2008).
102. CAL. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 2-400 (2008).
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Thus, it appears that Ceballos had fewer statutory options to
enforce the professional norms than the Court majority believed that he
had. While the focus of this Article is to discuss Ceballos' lack of
statutory options, it furthers the point that constitutional protection is
necessary for whistleblowers.
B. Mixed Results: Studies on the (Lack o) Success of Whistleblowers
Even when public employees do take advantage of the statutory
protections available to them, recent empirical scholarship has
demonstrated that the availability of legal protection does not guarantee
success for whistleblowers. A recent study of Merit Systems Protection
Board (MSPB) cases by Professor Paul Secunda aptly demonstrates the
low success rates of federal government employee whistleblowers.
10 3
Federal employees are not allowed to bring federal constitutional actions
to vindicate whistleblowing rights and thus must press their claims
through the MSPB. Professor Secunda analyzed the results of the MSPB
decisions and found not a single First Amendment claim brought by
public employees to be successful in the MSPB. 1°  This further
underscores the importance of the constitutional doctrine, even when it is
not a federal court case.
Retaliation against whistleblowers is not limited to the public
sector. In fact, most of the focus in recent years has been on how to
protect private sector employees in corporations from retaliation for
wrongdoing. The scandal surrounding the collapse of energy company
Enron in 2001 led to the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) corporate reform
legislation in 2002, which included a whistleblower statute provision.l°5
Professor Richard Moberly has studied the results of the SOX
whistleblower process and found whistleblowers to have difficulty
106winning their cases. His important analysis found a low success rate
103. Secunda, supra note 2.
104. Id.
105. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2008).
106. Richard Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of
Why Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65
(2007).
for corporate whistleblowers.10 7 Under the SOX regime, publicly traded
companies are required to ensure that their financial practices comportS •, 108
with sound accounting principles. Moberly found that administrative
law judges in the Department of Labor (which hears the claims) rejected
about 95.2% of whistleblower cases as a matter of law. 09 In the end,
only 3.6% of those who brought claims under the statute got relief.
These numbers suggest that the statute's exclusive remedy is no remedy
at all for most whistleblowers.
Even when systems exist for whistleblowers to utilize, Professor
Orly Lobel's detailed analysis shows that whistleblowers are unlikely to
take advantage of statutory opportunities, but rather prefer internal
grievance resolution.1 Further, internal reporting mechanisms, while
useful in resolving some misunderstandings, may also prevent
whistleblowers from taking advantage of the law. This may be for a
number of reasons, but the difficulty in navigating legal requirements
may be one major obstacle.
There may be a number of reasons for the lack of success of
whistleblowers. Perhaps most of the claims simply represented the
qualms of disgruntled employees. Or, the statutory systems perhaps
represented traps for the unwary. In either case, reliance on statutory
protections left many employees behind. Although the above examples
include private whistleblowers, public employees are also subject to
many of the same obstacles-administrative exhaustion, exemptions, and
malleable statutory language.
107. See Id. at 65 ("[d]uring its first three years, only 3.6% of Sarbanes-Oxley
whistleblowers won relief through the initial administrative process that adjudicates
such claims, and only 6.5% of whistleblowers won appeals through the process.").
108. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7261 (2008).
109. Moberly, supra note 106, at 71.
110. Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, Behavioral versus Institutional
Antecedents of Decentralized Enforcement in Organizations: An Experimental
Approach 15-16 (San Diego Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 07-126,
2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1031853.
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V. TRANSCENDING LEGISLATION:
FROM POLITICAL RIGHTS TO HUMAN RIGHTS
The legislative process is indeed an important vehicle to support
workers' rights. As described above, many of the advances in the
protection of workers by way of the legislative process have come
through statutory protection. The gains that were made by workers'
movements to protect collective and individual rights should not be
underestimated.
At the same time, there are reasons to be wary of placing too
much emphasis on statutory change to protect workers' rights. First,
legislative activity can be an enormous investment of resources,
particularly in the current political climate, where corporations will use
lobbyists to prevent the passage of statutes that interfere with their ability
to control the workplace. Second, legislative activity may take years
to complete. Finally, statutes often divide workers into categories
offering differing levels of protection.
There are certainly tactical issues that must be worked out for a
strategy that focuses primarily on the Constitution. Most obviously, the
federal judiciary can be antagonistic toward workers' rights,' 12 and there
have been many instances where the Supreme Court has not protected
employees.1 13 And certainly, there have been constitutional cases that
111. Timothy K. Kuhner, The Separation of Business and State, 95 CAL. L.
REv. 2353, 2361-63 (2007) (corporate resources overwhelm the voice of ordinary
citizens in the legislative process); U.S. Chamber of Commerce, About Us,
http://www.uschamber.com/about/default (describing the U.S. Chamber's important
role in national politics and its representation of more than 3 million businesses);
Thomas J. Donohue, Business, The Elections, and You,
USCHAMBER.comMAGAZINE, http://www.uschamber.com/content!080902.htm.
112. Richard Bales, A New Direction for American Labor Law: Individual
Autonomy and the Compulsory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights, 30
Hous. L. REv. 1863, 1865 (1994); Christine Godsil Cooper, Employment
Discrimination Law and the Need for Reform, 16 VT. L. REv. 183, 184 (1991).
113. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (holding that
arbitration clauses in employment contracts are enforceable, removing the right to
sue for discrimination in court); Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S.
642 (1989) (changing the burden of proof in employment discrimination claims in
ways to disadvantage plaintiff employees).
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have resulted in the retrenchment of rights.'l 4 But the debate about the
best way to protect rights continues. For example, some have argued that
the result in Brown v. Board of Education'15 would have been
accomplished even if the Supreme Court had not decided that "separate
educational facilities are inherently unequal."'1 6  Professor Gerald
Rosenberg has argued that the nation would have eventually come to this• • 117
realization. Similarly, none other than Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
has argued that protecting women's right to choice as a matter of
constitutional law blunted the movement in the states to protect the right
to choose an abortion.! I8 The debate in constitutional law will continue,
but the long trajectory of history means that there is no easy answer to
the question of whether legislation or judicial action best preserves social
change.
By contrast, the area of workers' rights has always been presumed
a matter, almost exclusively, of domestic statutory regulation." 9 Indeed,
in the early years of the labor movement, constitutional law was actually
the enemy of the movement to recognize the rights of workers to
organize in their interest. In Coppage v. Kansas,'20 the Supreme Court in
1915 held that "liberty of contract" in the due process clause prevented
states from passing laws prohibiting "yellow-dog contracts," or contracts
that conditioned employment on the employee's promise not to join a
labor union. 121 Other damaging Supreme Court cases, such as Loewe v.
114. See, e.g., Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000)
(allowing employers to require employees to use compensatory time absent a prior
agreement permitting the employer to do so); Circuit City Stores, 532 U.S. at 109
(requiring non-transportation worker to arbitrate claim).
115. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
116. Id. at 495.
117. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN THE COURTS
BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 169 (1991).
118. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1185, 1199-1205, reprinted in AMERICAN POLITICAL RHETORIC: A READER 152, 152-
54 (Peter A. Lawler & Robert M. Schaefer, eds., 5th ed. 2005).
119. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 54 (1905).
120. 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
121. Id. at 26.
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/-, 122
Lawlor (The Danbury Hatters Case), led to the passage of the Norris-
La Guardia Act of 1932, exempting labor negotiations from antitrust
liability and outlawing "yellow-dog contracts."' 23 Three years later, the
NLRA enshrined the right to organize in federal statutory law.1
24
This is not to say that the NLRA did not represent a sea change in
the protection of workers' right to organize, strike, and bargain with
employers. It is important, however, to recognize the constitutional and
human rights roots of these statutory advances. The right to assemble is
guaranteed by the First Amendment, which underlies employees'
freedom of association under the NLRA and international law.'
25
CI126 2
Supreme Court cases such as Hague v. CIO and NAACP v. Button1
27
were important in recognizing the rights of associations to assemble and. 128
to manage their own internal affairs.
Before the passage of the NLRA in 1935, there was also a
movement to base the right to organize on the Thirteenth Amendment to
the Constitution rather than on the Congressional power to regulate
interstate commerce.129  The Thirteenth Amendment1 30  prohibits
"involuntary servitude, other than punishment for the commission of a
crime" and, unlike the First Amendment, applies to both state action and
private conduct. Labor advocates argued that the lack of collective
bargaining for workers put them in a condition of involuntary
122. See Loewe v. Lawlor (The Danbury Hatters Case), 208 U.S. 274, 276
(1908) (holding that antitrust law prohibited members of labor unions from
boycotting in an effort to force an industry to unionize).
123. The Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified at 29
U.S.C. §§ 101-110, 113-115 (2007)).
124. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
125. See Int'l Labour Organisation (ILO), Freedom of Association and
Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, 1948 (No. 87), Preamble (July 9,
1948), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/association.htm.
126. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
127. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
128. Hague, 307 U.S. at 512; NAACP, 371 U.S. at 428-29.
129. See James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment versus the Commerce
Clause: Labor and the Shaping of American Constitutional Law, 1921-1957, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (2002); see generally Lea VanderVelde, The Thirteenth
Amendment of Our Aspirations, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 855 (2007) (explaining
interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment as protecting workers' rights).
130. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
servitude-unable to change the conditions of their work-in violation
of the Thirteenth Amendment. 13' The ultimate decision to base the right
to organize on the Commerce Clause may have made legal sense, but it
may have taken some of the moral force away from the fundamental
nature of the right to organize.
In part, the shift to the Commerce Clause and domestic legislative
protection has made the freedom of association and the right to bargain
collectively nothing more than a pet project of organized labor, rather
than a fundamental human right recognized in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and the International Labor Organization (ILO)
conventions.1
32
Similarly, by taking constitutional rights away from public
employees in the performance of their job duties, the Garcetti decision
does two things. First, the decision puts the act of whistleblowing on the
job into the political process, which often conflicts with adequate
protection for whistleblowers. Why would public officials who might be
the subject of a complaint by a public employee whistleblower have any
incentive to fully protect those that might expose their wrongdoing?
This means that public employees need to seek other avenues for redress.
Second, as some have argued, the different categories of protection
created by the Garcetti decision will mean different categories of
workers may not be able to report wrongdoing.
Having argued that constitutional law is the preferred way to
protect whistleblowers, there remains the question of what to do about
the Garcetti decision. There should be no illusions that the decision will
be easily reversed by subsequent constitutional cases. There may be,
however, future litigation that limits the scope of the "official duties"
exception. It is also possible, but not likely in the short term, that the
Supreme Court could revisit the decision in Garcetti. And yet, the past
shows that changes in constitutional law doctrine have resulted in
positive changes. 33 This is not to say that statutory change cannot result
131. Pope, supra note 129, at 14.
132. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 20(1) (1948),
available at http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html ("Everyone has the right to
freedom of peaceful assembly and association.").
133. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (recognizing the right
of consenting adults to engage in homosexual activity); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
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in positive change. At times, it has been court interpretation that
positively changed statutes.
In his 1991 book, The Hollow Hope: Can the Courts Produce
Social Change?, Professor Gerald Rosenberg argued that the Supreme
Court was an ineffective institution for producing progressive social
change.134 He expertly made an argument that Brown and Roe v. Wade
were not necessary to desegregated education or the right to choose an
abortion, and indeed might have been counterproductive to those rights.
In labor and employment law, which is largely statutory and
administrative, similar questions may be asked. Have statutes improved
the lives of workers? Nevertheless, statutes can sometimes fill gaps, and
in some cases can attempt to bring an integrated approach to the field.
This is the aim of the Federal Free Association for Workers Act proposed
by Professor Paul Secunda in his article for this Symposium.' 35 The
proposed federal statute would support greater associational freedoms for
public employees in protecting their privacy interests in intimate and off-
work association.136
While the legislation proposed by Professor Secunda would
undoubtedly plug many of the holes in current law, unanswered
questions remain. For example, will there be a division between the
associational rights of supervisors and managerial employees? Further,
if the problems remain with the definition of who is an "employee," there
will continue to be questions about the coverage that immigrants,
undocumented or otherwise, will get.
As I argued above, constitutional and international law principles
are not going to answer all of these questions either. But going back to
the constitutional discourse reasserts the fundamental nature of these
rights. As the Supreme Court has stated, the right of association is
fundamental to a free society. 137 Because of the fundamental nature of
(1973) (recognizing a woman's right to choose whether to have an abortion); Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (recognizing the fundamental right to marry); Brown
v. Bd. of Ed., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (rejecting the separate but equal doctrine in K-12
public education).
134. Rosenberg, supra note 117, at 35.
135. Secunda, supra note 50, at 367.
136. Id. at 365-66.
137. See id. at 343 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1960),
"It is not disputed that to compel a teacher to disclose his every associational tie is to
[Vol. 7
AGAINST LEGISLATION
freedom of association, the right should be as free as possible from the
political process.
Certainly, constitutional litigation will also leave gaps, but the
question is how should those gaps be filled, with statutory rights or
constitutional ones? Professor Cynthia Estlund has made a good
argument for changing the discussion about Garcetti from free speech toS 138
due process protections. She believes that the inquiry should be a
process-oriented question of whether the action taken against the
employee is consistent with just cause.139
The labor movement has recently been more involved in an
international strategy that emphasizes workers' rights as human rights.
One of those efforts was to take the Supreme Court's decision inN R 14 0 *o
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB the Freedom of
Association Committee of the International Labor Organization. In
Hoffman, the Court held that undocumented workers are not entitled to
the same remedies as other employees as victims of unfair labor• 142
practices. The ILO found that the Court's decision failed to
adequately protect undocumented workers in light of ILO Convention
87's mandate to respect freedom of association "without any distinction
whatsoever.,
143
The AFL-CIO has advocated on behalf of public employees in
international forums as well. In 2005, the labor federation filed an ILO
complaint against the U.S. government for its withdrawal of bargaining
rights for employees of the Transportation Security Administration,
impair that teacher's right of free association..., a right which, like free speech,
lies at the foundation of a free society.").
138. See Cynthia Estlund, Free Speech Rights that Work at Work: From the
First Amendment to Due Process, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1463, 1464-65 (2007).
139. Id. at 14'77-78.
140. 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
141. See ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, Complaint Against the
Government. of the United States, Case No. 2227 (2003), available at
http://white.oit.org.pe/sindi/english/casos/usa/usa200301.html.
142. See Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 149-51.
143. ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, United States (Case No.
2227), Report No. 332, 559, 610 (2003), http://webfusion.ilo.org/public/db/standa
rds/normes/libsynd/index.cfm?Lang=EN&hdroff= 1.
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charged with security screening at U.S. airports. 144 Labor unions have
also filed petitions under the North American Free Trade Agreement,
protesting the lack of bargaining rights for public employees under North
Carolina law. 145 The cases have achieved some success in raising the
international profile of domestic legal issues, even while legislative
efforts continue.
Similar principles could be used in reaction to the rights taken
from whistleblowers in Garcetti. The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights also includes a free speech provision. 146 While the principles of
international law sometimes contain exceptions, for example relating to
public safety officers and national emergencies, these exceptions should
not be taken lightly and should be policed, leaving fewer cracks for
employees to fall through.
Of course, not all domestic rights are amenable to international
forums. Advocates should exercise care in putting inordinate resources
into these forums, but they can provide important grist for the movement.
Some might question whether it is antidemocratic to place so much faith
in the courts. This is a legitimate concern, but the state of the legislative
process itself has become impermeable to many without power or
influence. And further, courts can also interpret statutes to change their
meaning. Thus, the counter-majoritarian thesis loses some of its force.
144. Statement by AFL-CIO President John Sweeney and AFGE President
John Gage On the ILO's Recommendation to Give TSA Workers the Right to
Organize, AFL-CIO, Press Releases, Speeches & Testimony, Nov. 15, 2006,
http://www.aflcio.org/mediacenter/prsptm/prl 1152006.cfm. See also Karen Rutzick,
UN Office: TSA screeners have collective bargaining rights,
GovernmentExecutive.com, Nov. 16, 2006, http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/1 106
/I 11606rl.htm.
145. National Union of Public and General Employees, Labour Groups
Charge U.S. with Violating NAFTA Labour Standards, Apr. 22, 2008, http://www.nu
pge.ca/news_2008/n22ap08c.htm.
146. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 132, at Art. 19.
("Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes
freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.").
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Professor Erwin Chemerinsky has criticized Garcetti.1
4
1
Chemerinsky has also argued that judicial review is necessary for
148progressive constitutionalism. In contrast to popular constitutional
theorists who argue that judicial review should be diminished in favor of
movements toward legislatures, Chemerinsky reminds that legislatures
have not always taken into account the interests of minorities.
14 1
If the Court is to improve on Garcetti and all public employee
speech cases, it must move away from treating public employee speech
differently than other kinds of speech. Even the Pickering analysis that
applied to all public employee cases treated some types of speech
differently than others. If government officials are limiting speech
because of its content, then they should be subjected to the same rules
that apply to other content or viewpoint restrictions. Thus,
whistleblowers could argue that their speech against supervisors was
motivated by an effort to suppress the content or viewpoint of the speech,
subjecting the decision maker who allegedly retaliated to justify their
actions under strict scrutiny.
The courts may not seem hospitable to progressive
constitutionalism at this point in history, but one must remember there
was a time when conservative constitutionalism was also at a low ebb.
For example, the accepted interpretation of the Second Amendment had
for years been to include only a collective right to bear arms as part of a
militia. 150 Years of conservative advocacy, and of course a number of
new appointments to the Supreme Court, recently led the Court to hold
that the Second Amendment also encompasses an individual right."'
147. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Kennedy Court: October Term 2005, 9
GREEN BAG 2d 335, 340-41 (2006); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rookie Year of the
Roberts Court &A Look Ahead, 34 PEPP. L. REv. 535, 538-9 (2007).
148. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism
as the United States Enters the 21s' Century, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 53, 61-62
(2004).
149. Id.
150. See, e.g., Carl T. Bogus, The History and Politics of Second Amendment
Scholarship: A Primer, 76. CHI.-KENT L. REv. 3, 3-5 (2000).
151. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2799 (2008).
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This advocacy is the kind of work that needs to be done by• . 152
progressive constitutionalists. As Professor Chemerinsky has argued,
the methods of progressive and conservative constitutionalism are the
same-the results are the only difference."53 Textualist and Originalist
interpretations of the Constitution reveal no real difference between the
First Amendment as it applies to nonemployee speakers and public
employees. The only difference is the vast expansion in the government
workforce from 1789 that would at best call for reasonable time, place,
and manner restrictions.
In sum, I argue that placing workers in different categories
divides and conquers the workforce in ways that are not compelled by
the Constitution. A move toward constitutionalism instead of legislation
requires fewer categories and divisions than currently exist in statutes to
more fully protect government whistleblowers.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article suggests that the antidote for the problems with
Garcetti v. Ceballos may not lie in the passage of a new statute. This is
not a new idea, but it has not often been applied to labor and employment
law, which is heavily statute based. The broad principles of
constitutional and international law should be used to restore the debates
about the free speech rights of public employee whistleblowers to a
higher plane. The debate about protecting public employees through
legislation inevitably leads to questions of whether government officials
can be trusted to fully protect whistleblowers who may report their
wrongdoing. In this way, the issue of whistleblower protection may
present a classic public choice problem.
54
In the end, Garcetti v. Ceballos has some unique facts that take it
out of the realm of a typical whistleblower case. Ceballos was a deputy
district attorney, which brings with it certain other obligations to speak
out. Perhaps a response from the organized bar is appropriate to deal
152. See ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 285-89 (1994).
153. Id. at 59-60.
154. For more information on public choice problems, see DENNIS C.
MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III (2003).
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with issues that are unique to attorneys. In any case, the principles that
underlie attorney ethics also contribute to the constitutional value of
whistleblower speech, in that it is high value speech that challenges
existing power structures. Appealing to the lawyer as a public citizen,
this seems to be a matter where codes of professional conduct can deal
with retaliation.
155
Despite the special case of lawyers and prosecutors, courts should
get away from the categorical approach that marks Garcetti v. Ceballos.
The decision carves out a particular category of public employees whose
"official duties" take away their protection as constitutional persons
under the First Amendment. Advocates for public employee rights thus
should not place all their eggs in the statutory basket, because legislation
offers hollow hope for the protection of public employee citizens who
report wrongdoing.
155. It should be noted here that no provision of the law governing lawyers
specifically prohibits retaliation against a subordinate for reporting misconduct to
state bar authorities. In California, for example, the most analogous Rule of
Professional Conduct is the one prohibiting bias and retaliation on the basis of race,
gender, and other categories. See CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2-400 (2008).
This provision would clearly not apply in Ceballos' case, so his superiors would be
unlikely to face any bar discipline even if they were found by a tribunal to have
retaliated against him for his complaints.
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